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I. INTRODUCTION
WHEN the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark
"right to die" decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health' thirty years ago, the dissenting Justices and
many observers criticized the Court for rejecting a right of Nancy
Cruzan's parents to refuse medical care on her behalf.2
Ms. Cruzan had not written a living will or a durable power of attorney,
nor did it appear that she had left clear oral instructions about her
wishes.3 But she did have loving parents who were dedicated to doing
what was best for her. In one important view, when patients lose the abil-
ity to decide for themselves, the law should turn to family members to
make medical decisions for them. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has
observed, "Almost invariably the patient's family has an intimate under-
standing of the patient's medical attitudes and general world view and
therefore is in the best position to know the motives and considerations
that would control the patient's medical decisions."4
Nevertheless, according to the Cruzan Court, "If the State were re-
quired by the United States Constitution to repose a right of 'substituted
judgment' with anyone, the Cruzans would surely qualify. But we do not
* Judge Jack and Lulu Lehman Professor of Law, UNLV William S. Boyd School of
Law; M.D., Harvard Medical School; J.D., Harvard Law School. I am grateful for com-
ments by Thaddeus Pope and the editorial assistance of the SMU Law Review.
1. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
2. See id. at 327-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ellen Goodman, Coming to Missouri?
Bring a Living Will, ST. LoUis Pose-DisPACH, June 29, 1990, at 3C.
3. On remand, new witnesses came forward, providing sufficient evidence of Ms.
Cruzan's wishes from her conversations with them. GI uoRv E. PFNC F, MEDICAL E'iii cs:
ACCOUNTS of- GROUND-BREAKING CASEs 66 (7th ed. 2015).
4. In re Johes. 529 A.2d 434. 445 (N.1 19871.
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think the Due Process Clause requires the State to repose judgment on
these matters with anyone but the patient herself."5
Accordingly, it was permissible for the Missouri Supreme Court to hold
that Ms. Cruzan's feeding tube could be withdrawn only if she had left
"clear and convincing" evidence of her desire not to receive artificial
feeding in the event that she became seriously and irreversibly ill.6 She
needed to have completed an advance directive7 or otherwise have pro-
vided clear guidance regarding her treatment preferences.?
After Cruzan, for incapacitated patients who do not leave solid evi-
dence of their treatment preferences, family authority to make medical
decisions has depended on state law. States can follow the Missouri Su-
preme Court and reject family decision-making, or states can choose to
recognize family decision-making on behalf of incompetent patients who
have not left clear guidance. Over time, most states have recognized fam-
ily decision-making, sometimes by court decision, more often by surro-
gate decision-making statutes.9 In Virginia, for example, relatives of the
patients are authorized to decide for patients who are "incapable of mak-
ing an informed decision."1 0
II. LIMITATIONS OF SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING
STATUTES AND COURT DECISIONS
But there are important gaps in state law. Some states have not recog-
nized family decision-making by either court decision or statute." For
patients who have not left clear evidence of their treatment preferences
or formally appointed a surrogate, continued treatment may be
required. 1
In states that have surrogate decision-making statutes, many limit
which family members may serve as surrogates.13 For example, while Vir-
ginia recognizes any blood relative,'4 Iowa's authorizing statute only in-
5. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286.
6. Id. at 286-87.
7. By "advance directive," I mean to include both treatment directives (also called
living wills) and durable powers of attorney for health care.
8. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-87.
9. Shana Wynn, Decisions by Surrogates: An Overview of Surrogate Consent Laws in
the United States, 36 Bnwo(AZ 10, 10 (2014).
10. VA. Com ANN. § 54.1-2986(A) (West 2010).
11. Wynn, supra note 9, at 10.
12. I say "may be" because health care providers vary in their approach. Some take
the view that absent an affirmative authorization by the legislature or judiciary, family
decision-making is not permitted. Other providers take the view that because family deci-
sion-making is well-accepted, see, e.g., MINN. Mjo. Ass'N, MMA Poi.unms 2019
§ 240.22(2) (2019), https://www.mnmed.org/MMA/media/Hidden-Documents/Policy-Com-
pendium-2019-l.pdf [https:/perma.cc/7XWE-Y7MK], it is permissible as standard of care,
absent legislative or judicial prohibition.
13. Amber R. Comer et al., "What Do You Mean I Cannot Consent for My Grand-
mother's Medical Procedure?": Key issues with State Default Surrogate Decision Making
Laws, 14 IM). HEAI-H L. REv. 1, 11-13 (2017).
14. VA. Coon ANN. § 54.1-2986(A)(6).
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cludes spouses, parents, adult children, and adult siblings.'' If an Iowa
patient's longtime caretaker is a niece, grandchild, or close friend, the
caretaker might not be able to decide on behalf of the patient without
securing an appointment by a court as the patient's legal guardian.1 6
Another important limitation on family decision-making turns on the
patient's medical condition. The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
applies to all patients, regardless of the severity of their condition.'? A
patient who only needs a blood transfusion to restore good health has the
same right as a patient refusing artificial ventilation or chemotherapy at
the end stage of cancer.'8 Nevertheless, many statutes or court decisions
that recognize surrogate decision-making limit their applicability to pa-
tients with a terminal illness or permanent unconsciousness, sometimes
with a third category of very serious and irreversible illness.'9 These stat-
utes or decisions would not apply to a patient with Alzheimer's disease
whose life expectancy is measured in years rather than months.2 Thus,
for example, while the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized family de-
cision-making in the Jobes case for a permanently unconscious patient, it
rejected family decision-making in the Conroy case for a patient with ad-
vanced dementia.2 ' New York statutory law parallels New Jersey com-
mon law. Under the Family Health Care Decisions Act, family members
or close friends may refuse life-sustaining treatment for patients who are
terminally ill or permanently unconscious, but generally not for other
patients.22
Finally, a few surrogate statutes limit the authority of family members
to authorize the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration.23 Even though
the right to refuse treatment applies to all health care, including artificial
nutrition and hydration, some states distinguish between nutrition and
hydration, on one hand, and other kinds of health care, on the other
hand, such as ventilators, dialysis, and surgery.24 In Ohio, for example,
artificial nutrition and hydration may be discontinued from a perma-
nently unconscious patient only with a court order.25
The impact of these limits on family decision-making can be illustrated
by revisiting a key withdrawal of treatment case, In In re Conroy,26 the
15, IOWA Cont ANN. § 144A.7 (West 2014).
16. See id.
17. MARK A. HAl EFr AL., HFAIrIl CARLi LAW AN) ETics 522 (9th ed. 2018) (quot-
ing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225-26 (N.J. 1985)).
18. Id. at 521-24.
19. See, e.g., Ti x. HrALsll & SAimrY ConE ANN. § 166.031 (West 2017).
20. See, e.g., infra note 21.
21. HAL, ei Al.., supra note 17, at 553-54 (citing Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225-26).
22. For patients who have an incurable condition, family members or close friends
may refuse life-sustaining treatment that is inhumane or extraordinarily burdensome. N.Y.
Pi in. HIA :ri LAW § 2994-d(5)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2018).
23. See, e.g., Oino Riv. Cooi ANN. § 2133.09 (West 2017).
24. See Howard Brody et al., Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The Evolution of Eth-
ics, Evidence, and Policy, 26 J. GIN. INTIRNAL MIT. 1053, 1054 (2011).
25. Oino REy. Cooi_ ANN. § 2133.09.
26. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
2020] 157
SMU LAW REVIEW
patient, Claire Conroy, suffered from advanced dementia and was living
in a long-term care facility.2' At issue was whether to withdraw her feed-
ing tube? She had not documented her wishes in a living will or power of
attorney, nor had she provided clear instructions in conversations with
family members or health care providers.29 In terms of family, she
had never married, and had very few friends. She had been very
close to her three sisters, all of whom had died.
[Her] only surviving blood relative was her nephew, the guardian,
Thomas Whittemore. He had known her for over fifty years, had vis-
ited her approximately once a week for four or five years prior to her
commitment to the nursing home, and had continued to visit her reg-
ularly at the nursing home for some time.30
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that treatment could
be withdrawn from a patient like Ms. Conroy on the basis of clear evi-
dence of the patient's wishes (a "subjective" test similar to the Missouri
Supreme Court standard in Cruzan).31 If clear evidence was lacking, then
treatment withdrawal could be based on the patient's best interests if the
patient suffered from unavoidable pain and the burdens of prolonged life
markedly outweighed the benefits of maintaining treatment (under two
"objective" tests).3 2 But the court did not authorize Ms. Conroy's nephew
to decide on her behalf.33
If a case like Conroy arose today, surrogate decision-making would
lack authorization in many states. Ms. Conroy's closest family member
was her nephew, and as indicated, many surrogate statutes do not look
beyond the nuclear family.34 Moreover, Ms. Conroy was neither termi-
nally ill nor permanently unconscious.3 5 Finally, the decision at issue in-
volved the provision of artificial nutrition rather than a ventilator or
other more intensive care.3 6
IIL. ADDRESSING THE LIMITS OF SURROGATE DECISION-
MAKING STATUTES
In the conventional view, the gaps in surrogate decision-making laws
need to be filled in on a state-by-state basis, either through judicial deci-
sion or legislative reform. And good models exist. In Maine, for example,
life-sustaining treatment decisions can be made not only by family mem-
bers but also by an "adult who has exhibited special concern for the pa-
27. Id. at 1216-17.
28. Id. at 1217-18.
29. See id. at 1243-44.
30. Id. at 1218.
31. Id. at 1229.
32. More specifically, the Conroy court established two "best interests" tests: a "lim-
ited-objective" best interest test and a "pure-objective" best interests test. Id. at 1232.
33. Id. at 1243-44.
34. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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tient, who is familiar with the patient's personal values." 7 Or in Indiana,
surrogates can make decisions for any treatment and for patients with any
medical condition.38 And in Virginia, any blood relative can authorize the
withdrawal of any kind of treatment from any patient lacking decision-
making capacity.3
But there is good reason to think that states already have a greater
obligation to recognize family decision-making than is generally appreci-
ated. Arguably, the Constitution requires an important degree of family
decision-making.
Consider in this regard an exchange between the Cruzan majority and
a concurring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. After the majority discussed
why Missouri did not have to permit family members to make medical
decisions for incapacitated patients, the Justices wrote:
We are not faced in this case with the question whether a State might
be required to defer to the decision of a surrogate if competent and
probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed
a desire that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be
made for her by that individual.4 0
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor elaborated on that footnote,
saying:
I also write separately to emphasize that the Court does not today
decide the issue whether a State must also give effect to the decisions
of a surrogate decisionmaker. In my view, such a duty may well be
constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment.4 '
As both the majority and Justice O'Connor suggest, the procedural
rules for designating a surrogate decision maker should parallel the pro-
cedural rules for refusing unwanted treatment. Just as patients can direct
future treatment decisions by leaving clear evidence of their wishes
whether or not to accept care, they should be able to direct future treat-
ment decisions by leaving clear evidence of their wishes about the person
they want to make treatment decisions for them. If a patient designates a
spouse or adult child as a surrogate decision maker, the spouse or adult
child should be able to speak for the patient.
To some extent, the procedural rules are in sync. For example, people
can execute an advance directive to express either their wishes about
treatment or about a surrogate decision maker.4 2 To document their pref-
erences about treatment, people can write a "treatment directive," com-
37. Mi. REv. SrAV. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-805(c) (1995).
38. IND. Coo ANN. §§ 16-36-1-1, 16-36-1-5(a) (West 2018).
39. VA. Coin ANN. § 54.1-2986(A) (West 2010).
40. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12 (1990).
41. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
42. Kathy L. Cerminara & Joseph R. Kadis, Give Me Liberty to Choose (a Better)
Death: Respecting Autonomy More Fully in Advance Directive Statutes, 10 ST. Louis U. I
Hi:AI;nr L. & PoE'Y 67, 69-70 (2016).
2020] 159
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monly called a living will.43 To document their preferences about a
surrogate decision maker, people can grant a power of attorney.44 Both
types of documentation are legally valid, and their recognition is almost
certainly required by the Constitution.4 5
But when it comes to other kinds of clear and convincing evidence of a
patient's wishes, it is assumed that the rules diverge between preferences
about treatment and preferences about a surrogate decision maker. This
divergence can be illustrated by California statutory law. California de-
fines an "individual health care instruction" as "a patient's written or oral
direction concerning a health care decision for the patient. " 4 6 But it de-
fines a "power of attorney for health care" as "a written instrument
designating an agent to make health care decisions for the principal."4 7
Judicial decisions also illustrate the divergence between patient wishes
about treatment and patient wishes about a surrogate. On one hand,
courts routinely recognize that treatment decisions may be guided by
clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes, even when unwrit-
ten . 48 Accordingly, in case after case, courts parse past conversations be-
tween the patient and family members or friends to see if the patient's
wishes were clearly stated. Courts also consider other evidence of a pa-
tient's preferences, such as religious beliefs or the patient's past practices
with respect to health care decisions.4 9
Thus, for example, in In re Swan,50 the court considered statements
made by Chad Swan less than two years before he suffered serious inju-
ries in an auto accident and was left permanently unconscious.5
1 The
court concluded that the statements provided clear evidence of his wishes
not to be treated.5 2 He had spoken to his mother about a highly publi-
cized local case in which the patient had also become permanently uncon-
scious from a motor vehicle accident.53 Chad said to his mother, "If I
can't be myself .. . no way... let me go to sleep. 54 In addition, just eight
days before his own auto accident, after visiting a comatose friend in the
hospital, Mr. Swan told his brother, "I don't ever want to get like that....
I would want somebody to let me leave-to go in peace."55
But courts do not ask whether patients have left unwritten, clear and
convincing evidence of their preferences for a surrogate decision maker,
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 78 (indicating that the Cruzan Court was talking about powers of attorney).
46. CAL. PRoB. CoDE § 4623 (West 2000) (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 4629 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Mo. 1988), aff'd, Cruzan, 497
U.S. 261; In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990).
49. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N;E.2d 626, 631 (Mass. 1986): In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985).
50. Swan, 569 A.2d 1202.
51. Id. at 1205.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
160 [Vol. 73
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even though in many cases consideration of the relevant evidence will
make it quite clear that the patient wanted-and expected-that medical
decisions would be made by a spouse or other family member.56
Such consideration might well change the outcome if the issue came up
with another patient like Ms. Conroy. The court might discover that the
new patient relied heavily on a niece and nephew for guidance when
making important decisions, including financial and medical decisions.
The court also might find that the niece and nephew accompanied the
patient to doctors' appointments, that the patient routinely turned to
them for advice, and that the patient always followed their advice.
We don't have to speculate to recognize that many cases would come
out differently if courts asked whether patients had left clear and convinc-
ing evidence of their wishes for a surrogate decision maker. The Michael
Martin case provides a good example.
Mr. Martin had suffered serious injuries, including a head injury, from
an automobile accident that left him "unable to walk or talk, and ren-
dered him dependent on a colostomy for defecation and a gastrostomy
tube for nutrition." 57 He was able to understand "only very short and
very simple questions."5 8 He could not "accurately comprehend ques-
tions that [were] lengthy, verbose, or that require the retention of multi-
ple thoughts."59 In particular, he could not understand "his physical
capabilities and medical condition."60
Mr. Martin's wife testified to eight years of discussions regarding his
wishes in the event of a serious accident or disabling illness, the most
recent discussion occurring one month before his accident.61 These dis-
cussions took place after the Martins watched movies about people who
could no longer take care of themselves because of an accident or ill-
ness.62 The following is an excerpt about Mr. Martin's wife's testimony
from the court's opinion:
Mike stated to me on several occasions: "That's bullshit, I would
never want to live like that." He also said to me, "Please don't ever
let me exist that way because those people don't even have their
dignity." .. [Regarding a movie about a football player with a termi-
nal illness,] Mike said to me after we saw it together: "If I ever get
sick don't put me on any machines to keep me going if there is no
hope of getting better." He also said that if I ever put him on ma-
chines to keep him alive: "I'll always haunt you, Mary." Then he
would say, "Do you understand?" I always said "Yes." We watched
this movie at least two or three times and had virtually the same
56. Andrew J. Broder & Ronald E. Cranford, "Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary, How Was
I to Know?" Michael Martin, Absolute Prescience, and the Right to Die in Michigan, 72 U.
Dur. MaR~cY L. Rv. 787, 828-30 (1995).
57. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399,402 (Mich. 1995).
58. Id. at 403.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 404.
61. Id. at 411-12.
62. Id. at 412.
2020] 161
discussion each time. . . . Mike was an avid hunter and frequently
expressed concerned [sic] about a hunting accident. Mike frequently
told me that if he ever had an accident from which he would "not
recover" and "could not be the same person," he did "not want to
live that way." He would say, "Mary, promise me you wouldn't let
me live like that if I can't be the person I am right now, because if
you do, believe me I'll haunt you every day of your life."
6 3
While the Michigan court asked whether there was clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Mr. Martin would not want a feeding tube,
64 it did not
ask whether there was clear and convincing evidence that he wanted his
wife to make medical decisions for him. Had the court done so, it almost
certainly would have concluded that Mr. Martin's wife was the appropri-
ate surrogate decision maker. In his instructions to her and his requests
that she promise to abide by them, Mr. Martin clearly expected that his
wife would make medical decisions for him if he became incapacitated.
65
IV. CONCLUSION
The legacy of the Cruzan case has been profound. It firmly established
the right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining treatment in the law, it
prompted legislative reform at the federal and state level,
66 and it did
much to spur people to engage in end-of-life planning with their families
and physicians to ensure that their wishes about treatment would be car-
ried out.
But an important part of Cruzan's legacy remains unfulfilled. Even
though the case signaled that surrogate decision makers can be author-
ized through any kind of clear evidence of a patient's preferences, not just
through formal durable powers of attorney, courts and most scholars
have not recognized this aspect of the Cruzan decision. Going forward,
courts, hospitals, and other health care providers need to ensure that they
fully respect patient preferences with regard to surrogate decision
makers.
63. Id.
64. The court thought there was not, and it cited evidence that didn't seem to support
a finding of clear and convincing evidence. For example, two coworkers stated that, while
Mr. Martin indicated his desire not to be kept alive if in a vegetative state, his present
condition was "not the type referred to in conversations with them before his injury." Id. at
412-13. In addition, several witnesses testified that, after his accident, Mr. Martin would
shake his head "no" "when asked if he ever felt that he did not want to continue living." Id.
at 413.
65. Broder & Cranford, supra note 56, at 828.
66. Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act, and many states enacted ad-
vanced directive and surrogate decision-making statutes. Comer et al., supra note 13, at
9-10.
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